the frontier zones and inhabited by ethnic minorities with possible separatist agendas. In addition, they represent vast grazing areas for a livestock sector with promising future perspectives. China belongs to one of the largest meat producers in the world, and it could become a major exporter of pork.
It is said that the rapid increase of grazing animals in the pastoral areas (from approximately 29 million in 1949 to 90 million in the early 1990s), as well as the decline in the area of rangeland due to reclamation (an estimated loss of 6.5 million hectares over 1949-92), has led to serious rangeland degradation and desertification. In 1994, over one-third of usable rangeland had been reported degraded to a certain degree, while total biomass production per hectare had declined to 30-50 per cent of that in the 1950s.3
For a long time, China had no comprehensive long-term policy for rangeland. In the past, policy-makers saw no urgency for a nation-wide rangeland policy as the communes seemed to provide at least some sort of institutional structure for the use and protection of pasture. However, when the communes were dismantled it became apparent that collectivist structures had actually been the very basis of a "tragedy of the commons" in pastoral and semi-pastoral areas. Moreover, it was also clear to many that pastoral areas had been disregarded by reform policy-makers and that rangeland degradation was impending if the institutional vacuum left by the communes was not dealt with properly.
The economic reforms in China have seen a drive amongst policy-makers to regulate society by means of laws. The central government firmly believes that, in the transition from a socialist to a market economy, the traditional "rule of man" -renqing shehui, or "society of human emotion" -which dominated China for so long needs to be supplanted by the "rule of law"4 to provide people with a secure, rational and impartial mediation of interests. Over the years, there has been a succession of laws: the Press Law, the Advertisement Law, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, and so on. More and more aspects of society hitherto untouched by legislation are included. This background and the governmental fear of large-scale destruction of rangeland without strict regulations to guide its management and use prompted the proclamation of the Rangeland Law in 1985.
The Rangeland Law is the official legal expression of a rangeland policy that attempts to devolve the use rights and liability from the state and collectives to the individual. Under the principle that grassland is owned by either the state or the collective, households and collectives are allowed to contract the use of rangeland for a "long term."' In order to been highly frustrated over the last decade. In this respect, Longworth and Williamson have observed the following:
At central government level certain policies are in place and provincial, prefectural, county and even township officials will describe ... how the policy is working. However, at the village and household level, the policy does not exist. Situations illustrating this policy failure problem were observed in relation to the policing of pasture stocking rate limits.9
Currently, many policy-makers believe that the rationale of the rangeland policy as developed during the early reforms is outdated, or at least insufficient to deal with the new socio-economic environment of the late 1980s and 1990s. This idea has prompted policy-makers at the central and the provincial level to rethink and reshape the Rangeland Law and the rangeland policy it represents.'0 However, policy and lawmaking in China is an opaque area in which too many questions still remain unanswered. For example, why is the Rangeland Law so difficult to implement? Which department or departments took the initiative to formulate rangeland policy? Is there an underlying rationale for the Rangeland Law at all, or is it nothing more than symbolic, a political compromise between contending factions? This article argues that the Rangeland Law is a classic example of what the sociology of law terms a "symbol law." '' According to Marius Aalders, symbol laws stipulate certain norms and values not yet widely accepted in society, without the lawmaker having considered their practical feasibility and implementability. Symbol laws are generally ineffective, because the manner in which they are formulated ensures that they cannot achieve their aims, in order to satisfy the faction that opposes them. On the other hand, the faction striving for their formulation has won a pyrrhic 10. Dee Mack Williams argued that the discourse around the achievements and successes of national rangeland policy expresses "the environmental preferences and cultural biases of the Han Chinese" as opposed to nomadic, herders. According to him, "the status quo (of rangeland policy, P.H.) serves powerful political interests by reproducing a national discourse concerning the frontier that affirms fundamental assumptions about the accomplishments of the reform era, the benevolence of the Chinese state, and the superiority of Han civilization." Williams has rightly drawn more attention to the role of the discourse in shaping Foucaultian power relations between Han Chinese and nomadic pastoralists. However, the formulation and implementation of rangeland policy is not a static but rather a dynamic arena in which various forces contend with each other over maintaining or changing the status quo. Moreover, as I will demonstrate, the legal and institutional context is an even greater factor in shaping the discourse of rangeland policy, apart from cultural, spatial and ecological preferences of To answer the questions above, the content of current rangeland policy is reviewed, with special emphasis on the Rangeland Law and other legal regulations. The next section takes a brief historical look at rangeland regulations, the rights of ownership and user, and rangeland protection and improvement, starting from the latter half of the 1940s. The article then charts the formulation of rangeland policies, laws and regulations from the central government level down to the provincial level.'3 Although analysis of the implementation process at the grassroots level is necessary in order to determine the actual effects of rangeland policy, this is too extensive an issue to be dealt with here.'4 Land Reform and Ownership Rights: Land to the Herdsman?
After the land reform, individual ownership was abolished, but it was not until 1956 that rangeland was officially nationalized. At present, there are two forms of ownership for rangeland: state and collective ownership.'5 This reply was given by a senior official of the Department of Animal Husbandry in Ningxia in answer to my question, when rangeland was nationalized and which forms of rangeland ownership exist in China. A teamleader, a township head or any other official will probably give a reply that is a variation on this theme. The year given for nationalization can vary a little, but all will agree on the principle of state and collective ownership of rangeland. However, there is a wide diversity of views on which rangeland is state-owned and which is collectively owned. There is an apparent contradiction between the perception of ownership of rangeland at the village level and the official reading of its ownership. Where does the confusion around the rights of ownership and use arise from?
To clarify this question it is first necessary to have a closer look at the 1985 Rangeland Law. One of the crucial stipulations, article 4, clearly states that:
Rangeland is state-owned, apart from rangeland that is collectively owned as stipulated by the law. Collectives are allowed the long-term use of state-owned rangeland. State-owned rangeland, collectively owned rangeland and state-owned rangeland which is in long-term use by the collective, can be contracted by the collective or the individual for animal husbandry production.16
However -and this is the catch -the Rangeland Law does not define state-owned and collectively owned rangeland, for various historical reasons.
Before land reform, rangeland in China was owned by princes, lamaseries, landlords or clans, yet it was commonly used by herders and livestock farmers. The end of the traditional property rights systems in China was heralded by land reform. The timing of land reform for grazing lands differed for the various pastoral regions. In Inner Mongolia it was executed simultaneously with agricultural land reform from 1947 until 1952. In Xinjiang it took place in 1953 and 1954, in Qinghai it was conducted from 1952 until 1958, in Sichuan it lasted from 1955 until 1960, while Tibet was the latest with the period 1959 to 1961. Also the extent to which grazing lands were expropriated from landlords and rich farmers differed over time and place.17 The early land reform in the "old revolutionary base areas" (Shaan-Gan-Ning border region) took a more radical stance against landlords, and most of their land property (including grazing land) was confiscated and redistributed. However, in the later period a more moderate line was followed and rich and middle peasants were allowed to keep part of their landholdings.'8 By the time land reform came to an end, rangeland had been declared public property with the policy line: "rangelands are public, grazing is free" (muchang gongyou, fangmu ziyou), although small portions remained in private hands.'9
In his excellent work on the Rangeland Law, the Chinese jurist Shi Wenzheng gives a detailed account of the history of rangeland rules and regulations. He is the first to note that rangeland in China was declared public property without any legal expression; it was incorporated neither in the Constitution nor in any other law. This might be symptomatic of the highly politicized and revolutionized atmosphere in which land-tothe-tiller movements generally tend to take place, but it is best understood in relation to the low priority the Chinese government accorded to rangeland as compared to forests and other natural resources. The Constitution of 1954 stipulates only that "mineral resources, water, forest, wasteland and other resources specified by law as state property, are all owned by the whole people. For the first time the Constitution stipulates that rangeland can be owned by the collective, only simultaneously to create a problem by providing no clue to the meaning of the term "collective rangeland." This question pertains to rangeland that has been in long-term use by the collective after land reform. In order to clarify ownership and use rights of rangeland, and to provide a sound legal basis for the pasture contract system, the Chinese government faces the following problem: must collective rangeland be formally declared state property, as dejure it does not exist? Or would it be better to formalize that which has already become customary practice, namely ownership of rangeland by the collectives?
It is striking to see how the provincial governments, in an attempt to deal with the definitional problem of collective property, responded in diverse ways to the 1982 Constitution. Basically, their reactions can be put into four different categories. In China, wide disagreement exists over the exact meaning of "collective," which makes it difficult to specify which administrative unit has de jure (and, for that matter, de facto) use rights, let alone ownership rights. In the rural setting alone, the term collective refers simultaneously to several administrative levels and units: the township, the administrative village, the natural village, and any collective township and village enterprise. At the grassroots level this ambiguity becomes apparent as the township, the administrative village and the natural village frequently disagree over the unit in which the use and ownership rights of rangeland are to be vested. Yet the discussion about the level of (range)land ownership is not new. Before the lay-out of the people's communes was finally consolidated in the early 1960s by the "Work Regulations for the Rural People's Communes," the central government wavered between land ownership by the production brigade (roughly equivalent to its successor the administrative village) and the production team (the present natural village). When the Great Leap Forward was launched, the higher agricultural production co-operatives were overnight organized into the people's communes. These huge organizational units, which owned all the means of production in their territory, sometimes encompassed ten to 20 villages and had an average population of 25,000 people. However their scale soon proved to be ineffective. In response to the initial problems encountered during the Great Leap, the communes' ownership of the means of production -including agricultural fields, farm animals, implements and so forth -was broken up in a "three-level ownership." Below the commune were the levels of the production brigade and the production team.25 At the work conference in Zhengzhou in February 1959, central leaders decided that a "three-level ownership, with the brigade as primary accounting unit" would be the basic structure for the communes.
In the next year the complete failure of the Great Leap became apparent. As grain production plummeted and a nation-wide famine swept through the countryside, the government proclaimed the "Urgent Notice concerning the Political Problems facing the People's Communes," also known as the Twelve Articles. This did not change the situation of the brigade as the basic accounting unit. In March 1961, the draft version of the "Work Regulations for the Rural People's Communes" (popularly known as the Sixty Articles) was adopted at the work conference of the Chinese Communist Party in Guangzhou. Article 17 of the Sixty Articles determined that "all land ... within the territory of the production brigade is owned by the production brigade," and article 18 continued that "the production brigade must register and give land ... in permanent use to the production team."26 However, in September 1962, the Eighth National Party Congress adopted the revised draft of the Sixty Articles. Here the basic accounting unit was changed from the brigade to the team that from then on would also hold ownership rights to the land. Article 22 stipulated the following:
Collective forest, water resources, and rangeland, are all owned by the production team ... The management and ownership rights to land, animals, agricultural implements, forest, water resources, and rangeland as described above, remain unaltered for a long-term, after they have been fixed through negotiation and agreement of the Commune Members Committee or the Commune Members Representatives Committee.
This tenure system would stay essentially unchanged until the start of the demise of the communes in 1983.27
In time, the production teams came to regard rangeland they used as their own. However, the land tenure system of the collectivist period was never formally incorporated in law (only in Party regulations). When the communes were dismantled and the commune was replaced with the township, the brigade with the administrative village and the team with the natural village, rangeland ownership became ambiguous, particularly since the ownership rights stipulated in the Sixty Articles were not followed up in national law. As a result, no one knew which unit held ownership rights of rangeland: was it the former production team, which held de facto ownership rights of land? Or was it the brigade -the present administrative village?
As mentioned above, collective and state ownership of rangeland was only officially included in the Constitution on the eve of decollectivization. But the level of collective ownership remained as much an enigma as the legal procedures to establish it. Therefore, legally, all rangeland is still state-owned, whereas the practice of the pasture contract system gradually forces the Chinese government to clarify the uncertainty over state versus collective ownership of rangeland, and, if collective, the level of ownership.
The discrepancy in ownership perception between higher and lower administrative levels is clearly captured in two statements by officials in Ningxia. When asked about the difference of state and collective rangeland, the deputy head of the Ningxia Department of Animal Husbandry answered: "In Ningxia all rangeland is state-owned, but we have given use rights of rangeland to collectives or individuals under the pasture contract system."But a township head in the pastoral region in Ningxia, surprisingly stated: "Most of the rangeland in our township is collective property of administrative villages, while only a minor part, maybe a half per cent of all pasture, is state-owned, namely by state cattle farms." The following section discusses the practical consequences of the unclear structure of ownership rights for the pasture contract system.
Continued Confusion over Definitions: Who May and May Not Use and Contract Pasture
The first reference to use rights of rangeland in contemporary Chinese legal texts appeared in the Rangeland Regulations enacted by the Inner Mongolian government in 1965. They were amended in 1973, and two years later the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture provisionally approved their extension to eleven provinces and autonomous regions. The 1975 regulations stated that each county and banner (administrative unit equal to county) could allocate use rights: to state-owned profit and non-profit enterprises; and to production teams of the people's communes. In addition, they stressed the need for clear boundaries for rangeland, and called for well-defined use rights to be vested in the commune or the team.28
The use rights of rangeland were not defined in national law until 1985, three years after those for ownership rights. Article 4 of the Rangeland Law provides that long-term use rights to state-owned rangeland can be allocated to the collective. Furthermore, under the same article state and collectively owned rangeland, as well as state-owned rangeland in longterm use by the collective, may be contracted to collectives or individuals for purposes of animal husbandry. The government directly above the county level (prefecture and above) is responsible for the registration and issue of user permits for the lease of state-owned rangeland, while the county government can assume these responsibilities for collectively owned and used rangeland.29 In order to be able to exert stricter control over rangeland use and management, some policy-makers propose that use rights ought to be vested in the township (sumu in Inner Mongolia),30 or any other collective economic organization at the township level. The township would then be charged with the co-ordination of rangeland use by the individual herders. Others argue against this on the grounds that pastoralists' incentives for sustainable livestock production can only be enhanced if use rights are vested in the lowest possible unit, the administrative village (gacha), or even the natural village. Amongst the proponents of the latter view are those who plead for the politically sensitive option of the recollectivization of livestock production, or a land tenure system based on more traditional social ties. According to this, pasture contracts would be issued to traditional groupings such as the khot ail in Mongolia. These are herders' groups of from two to over a dozen families, depending on the region. The khot ail is responsible for the socialization of children, for the performance of familial rites and for economic activities such as the herding of collective flocks. However, this discussion is still going on, and a solution does not seem to be close.
Little is still known about the actual implementation of the pasture contract system in China. However, it seems that in Gansu and Inner Mongolia, the administrative village is generally seen as the owner of rangeland and therefore responsible for the issue of contracts, while the township acts as monitoring unit.3' Ningxia, on the other hand, shows a much more amalgamated image. In the pastoral region, user contracts have been issued directly by the county government to the natural villages. After use rights had thus been fixed, the township issued pasture contracts to individual households (implying that the township is the owner of rangeland), with the administrative village as monitoring unit. In the semi-pastoral regions no pasture contracts have been issued, either to natural villages or to farm households. The pasture is used in common by the administrative or natural village on the basis of boundary agreements issued by the township, or written by administrative villages Rangeland Law began, a group of reformists would launch a renewed attack on the faction represented by Song Rufen.55
Revising the Rangeland Law
At the time when the Rangeland Law was formulated, the philosophy behind it was based on two premises: the possibility of delineating and classifying rangeland by means of objective criteria of productivity and sustainability (stocking rates or carrying capacity); and an interventionist and active state to ensure that pastoralists comply with stocking rates. The DAHVS had envisaged rangeland policy developing in several stages. In the first stage, stocking rates of rangeland had to be assessed. For this purpose, the subordinate organs of the DAHVS were charged with the classification of rangeland in terms of typical vegetation and productivity (in kg per mu pasture) divided over warm and cold seasons. The pasture categories included plain grassland, steppe, sandy pastures, desert pastures and grassy desert pastures. Stocking rates are expressed in sheep equivalents, which is a weighted total of all the various kinds of ruminants.56
During the ensuing phase, rangeland was to be delineated (if necessary by means of fencing) and allocated to collectives and individual users. Livestock holders could then contract pasture use rights for a period of 30 to 50 years, while the ownership of rangeland remained in the hands of the state. In this manner liability of rangeland utilization would be effectively decentralized, thus relieving the tasks of control for the government, which only had to see to it that rangeland users abided by the prescribed stocking rates.
However, as noted above, enforcement of stocking rates has proven to be extremely difficult and in the majority of pastoral regions the pasture contract system for rangeland has not been implemented at all. In the process of rural reforms, livestock farmers and pastoralists have gained more managerial freedom and countervailing power. As a result the enforcement of stocking rates by means of purely administrative measures in a command-like fashion as during the people's communes has become increasingly ineffective, which has led to free-riding and overgrazing. On top of this, the retrenchment of the Chinese state is incompatible with the high transaction costs for the enforcement of stocking rates.
A This article does not deal with the ongoing discussions over the issues raised for revision of the Rangeland Law. In addition to problems such as the expropriation of rangeland and the establishment of a pasture use fee,"8 the issue accorded the highest priority for change by the DAHVS concerns the rangeland ownership and use rights. However, the members of the Amendment and Drafting Group are pessimistic that a suitable solution for this problem will be found in the short term. As a Chinese jurist remarked: "The Rangeland Law can not be a legal forerunner. As long as the issue of ownership and use rights to land has not been dealt with in the General Principles of Civil Law, we cannot hope that the Rangeland Law will bring this up on its own."59 57. Neither officials responsible for rangeland policy, nor literature about rangelands in China mention anything about the gap between the official statistics of contracted rangeland and the actual rate of implementation of the HCRS for rangeland.
58. In order to solve the "Tragedy of the Commons," the government attempts to imbue rangeland users with a sense of economic liability, in other words, the principle of "the user pays." The idea is that if rangeland users have an appreciation of the notion that land as a resource and a factor of production is not a free good, they will have incentives to develop a sustainable range use. 
Concluding Remarks: The Catch-22 Situation of Chinese Rangeland Policy
Of lawmaking Bismarck is said to have once remarked: "Laws are just like sausages, you don't want to know how they have been made." In China and abroad a considerable number of scholars and officials seem to adhere to this statement: they truly do not want to know. An attempt to chart rangeland policy in China from the centre to the locale has often been greeted with the reaction: why should you? Chinese bureaucrats justify their reaction by saying, "oh, the cultural level of the peasants is too low" (wenhua suzhi tai di), or "our legal system is incomplete" (fazhi bu jianquan), and would leave it at that.
There are many scholarly perspectives. Some scholars maintain that policy implementation studies should focus on implementation and concentrate on the lowest administrative level -the grassroots level, or the shopfloor level -because street-level bureaucrats60 are not only the tiniest cog in the bureaucratic machine but also the most essential one. If they fail or refuse to implement a policy the whole system stalls. Moreover, they are the ones directly in contact with the people for whom the policy is meant. It is their mutual interaction that determines the outcome of a policy. Some negative voices add that higher-level cadres do not even understand the situation at the grassroots, so that there is also no need to study their involvement in policy formulation. Naturally, there is some basis of truth in each of the arguments above. However, there are basically two reasons why the formulation process of the Rangeland Law itself is important to consider.
First, the history of the Rangeland Law and rangeland policy are in themselves a chronicle of the arduous struggle by the Chinese government to build up a coherent and effective body of laws and regulations to provide the basis for the "rule of law" in the pastoral sector. Studying the formulation process of the Rangeland Law and rangeland policy is thus also the study of a trial-and-error policy-making process by a government attempting to bring about social change by means of new rules. Every amendment in this process signifies a new stage, a new awareness of changed circumstances in the economy, as well as a political will to respond to these different circumstances.
Secondly, I maintain that the problems in rangeland management encountered at the grassroots level in China can only be fully understood in relation to the content of rangeland laws and policies, and how they came into being. The content of laws and policies are intricately linked to interministerial and departmental interest struggles, and this is nothing new. The Rangeland Law, however, is a classical example of a so-called "symbol law." This is clear, in particular, from article 4, which defines In this legal vacuum, the 1985 Rangeland Law defined the pasture contract system under which individuals and collectives could contract collective or state rangeland. But as long as state and collective ownership of rangeland, and the level of collective ownership, are not clarified, the consistency of the entire pasture contract system will be in jeopardy. Because of the implementation problems of the Rangeland Law, a small group of officials and scholars within the Ministry of Agriculture is quite determined to resolve the issue of rangeland ownership. However, it seems that the current political tide will work against them, and the chances that the revised Rangeland Law will provide a final and clear-cut decision on this matter are slim.
This article has also considered the relationship between central and provincial regulations on rangeland management and use. The first matter that arises is the inadequate demarcation of legislative responsibilities between the lawmaking bodies at various administrative levels. In some cases, provincial regulations have run ahead of national law. This is not a problem as long as provincial regulations have been formulated within the legal framework of the Rangeland Law. However, in the case of a delicate issue such as the definition of state and collective ownership, provinces have gone far beyond the boundaries of this framework and have taken political decisions over matters that have not even been resolved at the national level. This has happened because provincial governments are under pressure to stretch the limits of the existing national legal framework that no longer suffices to deal with the problems they encounter at the grassroots. Their legislative actions are attempts to innovate in areas where the centre is politically hamstrung because of interest struggles between departments and ministries.
Guiding the pastoral sector safely through the reform period is a very complex and difficult task facing the Ministry of Agriculture. The establishment of a coherent rangeland policy and a sound system of laws and regulations for rangeland management and use is hampered by many contradictions both within the content of laws and policies, and between the various policy-makers. Sometimes the solution of one merely evokes the rise of another. The present Rangeland Law reflects the political compromises that have been struck over sensitive issues, thereby allowing certain contradictory situations to persist. Although it cannot be hoped that the revised Rangeland Law -at present with no fixed schedule to be voted on by the NPC -will be able to deal with all these conflicting issues, there is no reason for pessimism.
Within the Ministry of Agriculture, and within research institutes scattered over the country, a small but growing group of officials and scholars continuously pushes at the limits of the politically possible. It has always struck me how well aware and critical this group of people is about the problems of rangeland policy formulation and implementation.61 It is time that charts the way out of the catch-22 situation of rangeland policy.
61. However ironical it may seem, the good thing about the Cultural Revolution is that it has formed this group of critical officials and scholars. At the time, many intellectuals were sent down to the pastoral areas to labour, or herd the sheep and goats. Quite a number of those working in research institutes that presently advise the Ministry of Agriculture on rangeland policy were once sent down to the countryside.
